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ARGUMENT
The
A.

District

Court Erred

BV Granting Howard’s Motion T0

Suppress

Introduction

The

district court’s

argued in the Appellant’s

error.

As

Howard was

not

order granting Howard’s motion t0 suppress evidence

brief, that is so primarily for

unlawfully detained by Trooper Green.

Rather, he

two reasons.

First,

was

was brieﬂy and lawﬁllly detained

as the

passenger in a trafﬁc stop, the lawfulness of Which he does not dispute, after the driver ﬂed the
scene and while ofﬁcers attempted to locate her t0 effectuate the purpose of the stop.

Then,

Within ﬁve minutes, ofﬁcers observed marijuana in plain View in the vehicle and had separate

probable cause to further detain Howard.
unlawfully detained, the
not a product 0f any

district court

illegality.

Howard’ s Respondent’ s

brief.

As
Article

I,

is

was

necessary t0 respond to certain arguments in

1

Howard

Greater Protection Than

failed t0 argue

below

that

Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides greater protection than does the Fourth
the circumstances of this case, that argument

(Appellant’s brief, p.8 n.4.)

279 (2009) (refusing

state is

is

not preserved for appeal.

See, e.g., State V. Kofoed, 147 Idaho 296,

to address

argument based on Article

Where, though the appellant cited

here.

This reply

the state argued in the Appellant’s brief, because

Amendment under

The

applied the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence that

Howard Has Not Shown That The Idaho Constitution Provides
The Fourth Amendment Under These Circumstances

B.

1

Second, even assuming, arguendo, that he was

it,

I,

297

n.2,

208 P.3d 278,

Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution

he “did not argue below that

.

.

.

Article

I,

§ 17,

of the Idaho

not conceding any issues addressed in the Respondent’s brief but not addressed

.

46219, 2020

WL 238743,

.

.

Amendment”);

provide[s] greater protection than the Fourth

Constitution

Cox, No.

*6 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2020) (non-ﬁnal) (refusing to consider

at

argument 0n appeal that Article

Amendment where

State V.

Section 17 provides greater protection than the Fourth

I,

the appellant only brieﬂy asserted as

much below,

but Without supporting the

assertion with appropriate argument).

Howard responds
the argument

its

holding.”

district court

was properly before
(Respondent’s

as

it

it

is

preserved because “the

found

district court clearly

speciﬁcally relied on the Idaho Constitution in reaching

brief, p.7 n.4 (citing Tr., p.55, Ls.3-10; p.58, Ls.14-19).)

did not “clearly,” or even opaquely,

In the passages cited

I,

argument

that the

by Howard,

ﬁnd

that the

The

argument was properly before

the district court cites both the Fourth

Amendment and

it.

Article

Section 17 as prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and concludes that the detention

here

was unreasonable under

both.

conclusion that the detention 0f
suggestion that Article

I,

Howard

Even

Howard do

if the

Ls.3-10; p.58, Ls.14-19.)

violated both provisions

But the mistaken

neither a holding nor a

is

Section 17 provides greater protection than the Fourth

under these circumstances, and the
passages cited by

(Tr., p.55,

not

district court

show

that

did not consider any such argument.

any such argument

argument were preserved, Howard

that Idaho’s appellate courts

have

C“

at

Amendment

fails to

is

The

preserved for appeal.

make

it

even on appeal.

He

argues

times construed the provisions 0f our Constitution to grant

greater protection than that afforded under the United States

Supreme Court’s

interpretation 0f

the federal Constitution.” (Respondent’s brief, p.8 (quoting State V. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 88, 90

P.3d 306, 313 (2004).) But he does not even attempt to show that

Which

it

would be appropriate

‘uniqueness of our

state,

to

do

so.

“He

presents no analysis

this is

.

.

.

one of those times

t0 demonstrate

how

at

the

our Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence’ support an

interpretation of our Constitution that

Amendment on
814

(Ct.

V.

Donate, 135 Idaho 469, 472, 20 P.3d

points out that, in Idaho, “‘police treat

(1998).)

that

V.

Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 298

hardly a distinction between Idaho and federal law, and

is

Howard

5, 8 (2001)).

you as a criminal only ifyour actions correspond.”

(emphasis in original) (quoting State

brief, p.8

But, that

n0 speciﬁc

the interpretation 0f the Fourth

the issues presented here.” State V. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 103, 57 P.3d 807,

App. 2002) (quoting State

(Respondent’s

would diverge from

Howard

points t0

factors or circumstances unique to Idaho With respect t0 trafﬁc stops or ofﬁcer safety

would suggest

Amendment.

that the interpretation

of Article

In fact, he does not even explain

preserved, Which

it

is

not, this

I,

Section 17 would diverge from the Fourth

how he

thinks

it

Even

should diverge.

Court should reject Howard’s invitation to interpret Article

Section 17 as applying differently than the Fourth

Amendment

if

I,

in this case.

Howard Has Not Preserved Any Argument That The Use Of Handcuffs Rendered The

C.

Detention Unlawful
In addition t0 suggesting for the ﬁrst time

greater protection than the Fourth

that Article

Amendment, Howard makes

appeal regarding the nature 0f the alleged

that

on appeal

illegality.

I,

Section 17 provides

on

a new, unpreserved argument

Howard argued below

that

it

was

the fact

he was detained that was unlawful, not the manner in which he was detained. In particular,

he never argued below that his detention was unlawful because he was handcuffed.
appeal,

Howard relies

Now, on

exclusively 0n the latter argument. (Respondent’s brief, pp.10-13 .)

Howard’s argument below was Trooper Green could not prevent him from walking away
from the trafﬁc

stop.

stop because Trooper

seized him.”

He

argued that Trooper Green was required t0

Green “lacked reasonable and

(R., pp.32-36.)

The heading of

let

him walk away from

articulable suspicion

the relevant section in

the

When [Trooper Green]

Howard’s brief below

is

titled,

“The ofﬁcer unconstitutionally detained Mr. Howard When he refused

parked vehicle on December

5,

2018.”

The

(R., p.32.)

brief makes

t0 let

no mention

him

leave the

at all that

he was

handcuffed. (R., pp.32-36.) At the hearing on the motion t0 suppress, he continued to argue that

it

was Trooper Green’s

Asked by

refusal t0 let

the district court

him

leave the scene that

why Howard

then mistakenly concluded that

it

was

the

that

he should have been permitted

(TL, p.45, Ls.4-18.)

The

district

of Howard’s detention that was

fact

unlawful—that Howard could not be detained as part 0f and

was effectuated—and

p.34, Ls.1-4.)

could be detained, the state speciﬁcally argued in

response that he could be detained as part of the trafﬁc stop.

court

was unlawful. (TL,

until the

t0

purpose 0f the trafﬁc stop

walk away from the scene.

(T12,

p.58, Ls.1-19.)

That conclusion
validity of

stop

was

is

Which he does not

effectuated.

As

erroneous.

dispute,

the passenger in a vehicle subject to a trafﬁc stop, the

Howard could be

(m Appellant’s brief, pp.8—10.)

detained until the purpose 0f the trafﬁc

The purpose 0f the

trafﬁc stop

been effectuated before ofﬁcers observed marijuana in plain View in the vehicle.
point,

Howard had only been

minutes

earlier,

Up

had not
to that

detained for ﬁve minutes, ofﬁcers had only located the driver three

and the driver was

denying that she was the driver and was providing false

still

information regarding her identity. (TL, p.15, Ls.13-22; p.16, Ls.5-19; EX.1, 3:56 — 8:50.) After

they observed the marijuana in plain View, ofﬁcers had probable cause t0 continue t0 detain

Howard and

On

investigate the possession of narcotics.

appeal, presumably because

has abandoned the argument that

it

and has adopted the new argument
0f handcuffs—that was unlawful.

it is

was
that

It

follows that

it

was lawful

directly contrary t0 Idaho

to detain him.

and federal law, Howard

the fact 0f his ﬁve-minute detention that

it

(E

was

the

was unlawﬁll

manner 0f his detention—speciﬁcally,

Respondent’s

brief, pp.10-13.)

the use

Those arguments are

Having already erroneously adopted the only argument Howard made below—that he

distinct.

could not be detained

Howard

appropriate.

at

all—the

district court

had n0 reason

t0 consider

whether handcuffs were

certainly could have argued, in the alternative, that even if he could

be

detained as part of the trafﬁc stop, the use 0f handcuffs rendered the detention unlawful, but he

E

did not do so.

645 (1998) (discussing

State V. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554, 961 P.2d 641,

considerations relevant t0 Whether handcuffs are appropriate in an investigative detention,

including a trafﬁc stop).

Nor

did the district court

make

that alternative holding.

E

Duvalt

131 Idaho at 553-54, 961 P.2d at 644-45 (where defendant did not argue below that use of

handcuffs during trafﬁc stop rendered the stop unlawful, addressing the argument on appeal only

because the

district court explicitly

which he

now

is

relying

is

addressed the issue below).

not preserved.

As

State V. Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275,

P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (“We have long held that appellate court review
theories

and arguments

omitted)).

that

a result, the argument 0n

were presented below.”

is

396

limited to the evidence,

(internal quotation

marks and brackets

This Court will not afﬁrm on an alternative theory that was not argued t0 the

district

court below.

ﬂ

district court

decision based 0n a “right—result, wrong-theory rule” Where the allegedly correct

State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,

443 P.3d 231, 240 (2019) (refusing

t0

afﬁrm a

theory was not argued t0 the district court below).

D.

Even

If Howard’s

Howard does

New Argument On Appeal Had Been Preserved,

not dispute that ofﬁcers

may employ

The Argument

Fails

handcuffs to address concerns

regarding “ofﬁcer safety or ﬂight” in investigatory detentions “such as the one in this case.”

(Respondent’s

brief, p.10.)

But though both of those concerns were present here, he argues

that

he was unlawfully detained because he was handcuffed.

(Respondent’s

He

brief, pp.10-13.)

is

mistaken.

Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have “recognized the
dangers to police ofﬁcers involved in routine trafﬁc stops, especially

occupant of the vehicle.” Du_Valt, 131 Idaho

at 554,

961 P.2d

the speciﬁc facts of the situation and the reasonable inferences

at

when there

645.

is

more than one

“Therefore, based

drawn from those

facts,

are entitled t0 use handcuffs in limited investigatory stops to maintain their safety.”

use 0f the handcuffs
handcuffs

is

is

upon

ofﬁcers

Li. “If the

a reasonable precaution t0 ensure the ofﬁcers’ safety, the use of the

warranted during the limited stop.” Li. “If the investigative detention becomes

unreasonable, the detention

becomes unreasonable,

is

transformed into an arrest.” Li. “In determining

the court

is

to consider: (1) the duration

if the detention

of the invasion imposed by the

additional restriction; and (2) the law enforcement purposes served.” Li.

The

Whether Trooper Green’s use of handcuffs was a “reasonable precaution”

question, then,

is

to ensure his safety,

and, later, the safety 0f other ofﬁcers at the scene.

It

clearly was.

the ofﬁcers

In Du_Valt, the Court held that, though there

were permitted

t0

were ﬁve ofﬁcers 0n scene,

handcuff the three occupants of a vehicle in a trafﬁc

stop.

Li.

As

factors justifying the use of handcuffs, the Court noted that the stop occurred late at night, that

the vehicle

was suspected of having been involved

the vehicle

had attempted

in drug activity, that ofﬁcers suspected that

t0 avoid the patrol car following

it,

and

that the defendant “refused t0

reveal his true identity to the officers.” Li. In State V. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 368-69, 986 P.2d

1030, 1034-35 (Ct. App. 1999), the Court of Appeals held that Where an ofﬁcer

at night to investigate a report

entitled to

of noises and three

men

was dispatched

at a storage facility, the

ofﬁcer was

handcuff and place the defendant in the back 0f his patrol car while he “searched and

secured the surrounding area.”

Li.

And, though not controlling on

(footnote omitted).

Court, Cardona V. Connolly, 361 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D. Conn. 2005),

ofﬁcer initiated a trafﬁc stop

at night, the vehicle

of the passengers got out 0f the vehicle and

The ofﬁcer then handcuffed

Amendment because

left,

the remaining passenger 0f the vehicle.

it

was a “‘reasonable response

The court noted

and

return,

weapons

that

he did not

know

if the

There, an

Li. at 27.

The court held

that

t0 the patrol car did not Violate the

to legitimate safety

V.

know Where

concerns.”

Li. at

Vargas, 369 F.3d 98, 102 (2d

two occupants of the

they had gone and Whether they

remaining passenger was armed or there were

in the car. Li.

The

trafﬁc stop in this case occurred late at night While Trooper

(Appellant’s brief, p.1.)

Green was alone.

Both occupants 0f the vehicle quickly exited and began walking away.

While Howard obeyed Trooper Green’s

(Id.)

point.

and the driver and one

Li.

that the stop occurred late at night, that

vehicle had ignored his instructions, that he did not

would

lot,

on

ignoring the ofﬁcer’s instructions.

31-32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States
Cir. 2004)).

directly

stopped in a parking

handcufﬁng the remaining passenger and bringing her back
Fourth

is

this

instruction t0 return t0 the vehicle, the driver

made

eye contact With him but ignored his instruction and continued t0 walk toward a private residence

and eventually out of

sight.

(Id.)

Howard then gave an

implausible explanation regarding the

reason the driver ignored Trooper Green’s instructions and refused t0

driver

2

The

was?

state is

(Id.)

not arguing that

Howard had

was obligated

t0

do

own

refusing

t0

identify

reasonableness of decision to handcuff occupants).

themselves,

was an

so,

safety.

554, 961 P.2d at 645 (noting that fact that occupants 0f vehicle were
including

Who

the

at night, in

an

a legal obligation t0 assist Trooper Green. Rather, his

contributing to Trooper Green’s reasonable concern for his

ofﬁcers,”

Trooper Green

Trooper Green was going t0 have t0 go search for the driver,

refusal t0 cooperate, Whether 0r not he

the

tell

E

“far

was a

additional factor

DuValt, 131 Idaho

at

from cooperative With

factor

contributing

t0

area with which he

instructions

was not

familiar,

after the

driver

had already disregarded

his lawful

and ﬂed the scene, and without knowing whether she was armed or would soon be

armed. Indeed, Trooper Green testiﬁed that he believed he might be dealing With a “barricaded
subject.”

Doing so would require leaving Howard unsupervised—a

(TL, p.14, Ls.9-16.)

passenger in the same car from which the driver had already ﬂed,
identifying the driver, and

the driver’s

there

were weapons
(Ct.

in the car or a

nearby house.

App. 2002) (holding

E

that ofﬁcers

if

Howard was armed

this case

Visitor

Visitor’s “presence

0n the

if

in

not detained, [he] could

have gone to any of the structures located 0n the premises that were subj ect

circumstances,

it

47

handcufﬁng a

were reasonable

posed an increased risk to the ofﬁcers because,

the barn, the stable, 0r the

0r Whether

State V. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 300,

house 0n which they were serving a search warrant because the

premises in

uncooperative in

apparently attempting t0 mislead Trooper Green regarding

whereabouts—When Trooper Green did not know

P.3d 1266, 1270
t0 a

Who was

who was

t0

search—the home,

vehicles—and destroyed evidence or obtained a weapon”). Under the

was reasonable

for

Trooper Green to brieﬂy handcuff Howard for his safety

While he attempted t0 locate the driver and effectuate the purpose of the stop.

Howard
arrived

on scene within minutes of the

more ofﬁcers
placing

argues that there were no concerns for ofﬁcer safety because “a backup ofﬁcer

arrived.”

Howard

ofﬁcer arrives

(Respondent’s

in handcuffs

at 02:55,

the patrol car at 03:58.

and

in the

initial

stop” and “within another two or three minutes,

brief, p.12.)

An

back of his patrol

ofﬁcer arrived as Trooper Green was

car.

(EX.1, 2: 10

while Trooper Green ﬁnishes cufﬁng and placing

The second ofﬁcer’s

previous decision t0 place

Howard

arrival in

in handcuffs.

That

is

n0 way

casts

—

04:00.)

Howard

The second

in the

back of

doubt on Trooper Green’s

particular so because both ofﬁcers

then immediately occupied with trying to locate the driver 0f the vehicle. (EX.1, 04:00

were

;

Tr.,

p.14, Ls.3-12.)

Howard posed

Trooper Green. The

0n scene

a safety risk t0 the second ofﬁcer just as he posed a risk t0

fact that there

n0 way suggests

in

circumstances.

E

were two people

that

initially in the vehicle

was unreasonable

it

and

now two

ofﬁcers

handcuff Howard under the

t0

Du_Valt, 131 Idaho at 554, 961 P.2d at 645 (holding that

it

was reasonable

t0

handcuff occupants 0f vehicle in trafﬁc stop though there were three occupants and ﬁve ofﬁcers

0n

scene).

Finally,

ofﬁcer—who

Howard

provides n0 explanation at

participated

also

in

search

the

all

the

for

how

the even-later arrival of another

driver—informs

in

any way the

reasonableness of Trooper Green’s earlier decision t0 handcuff Howard.

Next,

Howard

argument because

Howard.”
told

him

it

argues that “the Video in this case speciﬁcally contradicts the State’s
disproves Trooper Green’s testimony as t0 the reason he detained Mr.

(Respondent’s

in the Video that

According to Howard, Trooper Green speciﬁcally

brief, pp.13-14.)

he was being detained, not for safety reasons, but because he would not

provide the driver’s name.

(Id.)

Howard

further claims that the district court found as

much.

(Id.)

In the Video,

explained that

Howard appears

Howard was

committed a trafﬁc

later

for his safety

—

Howard was

(TL, p.14, L.22

was

he

is

being detained and Trooper Green

Violation, the driver “ran inside real quick,”

testimony that

safety reasons.

why

“not under arrest,” but was being detained because the vehicle

[Trooper Green] her name.” (EX.1, 2:18

Green’s

to ask

—

02:55.) A11 of that

is

and Howard was “not

entirely consistent with

Trooper

detained as part 0f the trafﬁc stop and handcuffed for

p.15, L.2.)

The primary circumstance giving

rise t0 a

concern

the driver’s decision to ﬂee, or “run inside real quick,” resulting in

Trooper Green believed to be a “barricaded subject,” and requiring him to g0 search for

An additional

telling

factor in the totality of the circumstances

was Howard’s unwillingness

What

her. (Id.)

t0 cooperate

by, ﬁrst, giving an implausible explanation of the driver’s refusal t0

refusing to identify the driver.

What Trooper Green said

With respect
“it

(Tr., p.14, Ls.4-21.)

in the Video

and

t0 the district court’s

There

his testimony that

is

obey instructions and then

simply no inconsistency between

he was concerned for his

supposed factual ﬁnding, What the

safety.

district court said is

appears because the defendant would not provide the trooper the name of the driver, simply

refused, he

is

handcuffed and put into the back 0f the trooper’s vehicle after being questioned.”

(TL, p.56, Ls.5-9.)

That

is

not even a ﬁnding that Howard’s refusal t0 provide a

factor contributing to the decision t0 handcuff

might have been.

Much

discussed above, there

name was

is

less,

though,

no question

is it

that

Howard,

as

opposed

t0 a

ﬁnding

a ﬁnding that ofﬁcer safety

Howard’s

refusal to cooperate

that

was not a

name was

a

appears

it

it

reason.

As

and provide the driver’s

a factor in the totality 0f the circumstances contributing t0 Trooper Green’s reasonable

concerns about his safety.

More

importantly, though, even if the district court had found that Trooper Green’s actual

reason for handcufﬁng

be irrelevant t0

Howard was

not a concern for his safety, as he testiﬁed

this Court’s analysis.

the use 0f handcuffs,

is

appropriate

The question Whether
is

it

was, that would

the nature of a detention, including

determined by Whether, as an objective matter,

it is

“a

reasonable precaution t0 ensure the ofﬁcers’ safety.” DLaIt, 131 Idaho at 554, 961 P.2d at 645.

“When

reviewing an ofﬁcer’s actions the court must judge the facts against an objective

standard. That

is,

would the

facts available to the

ofﬁcer

at the

moment 0f the

seizure or search

warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief” that the action taken was appropriate.”

V.

m

Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999) (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted);

ﬂ

also State V.

Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 291, 900 P.2d 196, 199 (1995) (“the

ofﬁcer’s conduct must be judged against an objective standard”); Padilla V. State, 161 Idaho 624,

10

627, 389 P.3d 169, 172 (2016) (same); United States V. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir.

1996) (holding that propriety of use of handcuffs determined by objective inquiry regarding what
a reasonable person under the circumstances would think

subjective reason for detaining

Howard

whether, as an objective matter,

was

in handcuffs is irrelevant to the question here,

was a reasonable precaution

it

Trooper Green’s

appropriate).

for ofﬁcer safety

which

is

and preventing

ﬂight.

The

obj ective factors in the totality of the circumstances

decision to place

The

E.

Howard

in handcuffs for the brief period that

District Court Erroneouslv

support Trooper Green’s

he was detained.

Suppressed Evidence That

Was Not The

Of AnV

Product

Police Illegality

Even where ofﬁcers engage
only Where that conduct

m

State V.

is

in unlawful conduct, the exclusion

of evidence

is

appropriate

the but-for cause of the discovery of the evidence t0 be suppressed.

McBaine, 144 Idaho 130, 133, 157 P.3d 1101, 1104

(Ct.

App. 2007).

“[t]he independent source doctrine allows admission of evidence that has

means Wholly independent of any
336 P.3d 232, 239 (2014)

constitutional Violation.”

(internal quotation

Relatedly,

been discovered by

State V. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 306,

marks omitted).

In addition, the inevitable

m

discovery doctrine allows the admission 0f evidence that was in fact discovered through illegal
conduct, but Which would inevitably have been discovered absent that illegal conduct.

m,
by

163 Idaho 490, 497-98, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-86 (2001). Even Where there

is illegal

conduct

ofﬁcers, “[t]he interests in deterring unlawful police conduct and in providing juries with

all

probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a

worse, position that they would have been in if n0 police error 0r misconduct had occurred.”

Russo, 157 Idaho

at

306, 336 P.3d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The

state

argued

that the discovery

of the evidence located in the stopped vehicle was not the product of Howard’s

was discovered by means of a lawful search of

detention, that the evidence

the vehicle

independent 0f that detention that occurred only after ofﬁcers observed marijuana in plain View,

and

that the evidence

would have been discovered

had not already been discovered. (Appellant’s
In response,

Howard acknowledges

as a result 0f a lawful search,

(Respondent’s

and

C“

an inventory search of the vehicle even

brief, pp.

1

that his detention

was not a

but-for cause 0f

and though he acknowledges

absent the misconduct,’” (Respondent’s brief, p.15 (quoting State V.

any and

all

brief, pp.16-18.).

Howard

is

must be suppressed

learned the defendant’s

name through

name

he

is

if police

were able

illegal police conduct.

law enforcement’s unlawful

effectively arguing that he

have occurred

But

3

He

if not for illegal

that

that the exclusionary

is

would have been

_,

but-for his detention,

apparently advocating the sweeping proposition that

(Respondent’s

actions, the evidence

immune from

how unconnected

t0 bring charges

a defendant’s identity that would enable the State to bring charges against
as a result of

discovery.3

Maxim, 165 Idaho 901,

evidence the prosecution might seek to introduce, no matter

illegal police conduct,

its

that the district court properly suppressed the

evidence found in the car because they would not have learned his

(Respondent’s

it

found in the vehicle was discovered

the same, not a worse, position that (sic) they

545 P.3d 543, 550 (2019)), Howard argues

if

5-21.)

that the evidence

brief, pp.16, 18.) Nevertheless,

rule should put ofﬁcers in

in

because they

brief, p. 18

him

is

to

(“When

discovered only

must be suppressed.”).) That

is,

prosecution because the prosecution would not

conduct.

View has been squarely rej ected by the United

States

does not independently address the inventory search issue.

12

Supreme Court.

In United

States V. Crews,

445 U.S. 463 (1980), the defendant accosted and robbed several women.

Li. at

465-66. Suspecting the defendant of the crime based 0n physical descriptions by the Victims, but

Without probable cause t0

him

detained him, took

arrest, police

photograph, Which they then showed t0 the Victims.

Li. at

and took

his

The Victims identiﬁed

the

to a police station,

465-67.

photograph as 0f the perpetrator, the defendant was arrested, and the Victims then identiﬁed him
again in line-ups.

467.

The

Li.

district

Defendant ﬁled a motion
court

suppressed

t0 suppress “all identiﬁcation evidence”

evidence

regarding

the

photographic

and line-up

identiﬁcations, but held that the Victims could identify the defendant in-court based

recollections of the defendant’s appearance.

that

Li. at 468.

The Court 0f Appeals

Li. at

on

their

reversed, holding

even the in—court identiﬁcation should have been suppressed, “reasoning that but for

respondent’s unlawful arrest, the police would not have obtained the photograph that led to his

subsequent identiﬁcation by the complaining Witnesses and, ultimately, prosecution 0f the case.”
Li. at

468-69 (footnote omitted).

The Supreme Court
identiﬁcation

rejected

was not a product of

explanation 0f how the prosecution

argument

that

View.

It

concluded that the Victims’

the unlawful arrest, even if the arrest

came

about.

Li

at

was

in-court

part of an

471-72. The Court explicitly rejected the

that the defendant could:

claim immunity from prosecution simply because his appearance in court was
precipitated

Viewed

Illinois,

arrest.

An

illegal arrest,

without more, has never been

as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction.

Gerstein
Frisbie

by an unlawful

v.

v.

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975);
Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); Ker v.

119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886). The exclusionary

principle of

Wong Sun and Silverthome Lumber

Government may

offer against the accused at

trial,

C0. delimits what proof the
closing the courtroom door to

evidence secured by ofﬁcial lawlessness. Respondent is not himself a suppressible
“fruit,” and the illegality of his detention cannot deprive the Government of the

13

opportunity to prove his guilt through the introduction 0f evidence Wholly
untainted by the police misconduct.

Li. at

474 (footnote omitted).

m

also

New York

could be no valid claim here that Harris was
the fruit 0f an illegal arrest”).

result

is

0f

Even Where

illegal police conduct, the

a product of police illegality,

V. Harris,

immune from

the defendant

is

495 U.S.

14, 18 (1990) (“There

prosecution because his person was

only in custody for prosecution as a

exclusionary rule bars the introduction only 0f evidence that

it

does not bar the introduction of other evidence

generally, the prosecution of the defendant.

Even assuming

Via police illegality, and even assuming that he

that

more

or,

Howard’s name was discovered

would not have been prosecuted had police not

learned his name, those facts have exactly nothing t0 do with the admissibility of the physical

evidence found in the

car.

Because that evidence was not the product 0f

illegality,

it

is

not

suppressible.

Unsurprisingly,

0n People

V.

Howard does

not cite a single case that supports him.

Leonard, No. 270638, 2008

WL

2185186 (Mich.

Ct.

App.

He

relies primarily

May

unpublished opinion from the Court of Appeals of Michigan, (Respondent’s

27, 2008), an

brief, pp.16-17).

But, far from supporting him, that case just illustrates the operation of the rule that

evidence that

is

a product of police illegality that

is

suppressed.

it is

only

There, a majority of the court

held that evidence 0f an out-of-court, line-up identiﬁcation 0f the defendant by a Victim should

be excluded because the defendant was only placed in the lineup as a result of an unlawful trafﬁc
stop.

Leo_nard,

No. 270638, 2008

WL 2185186, at *1 1-13.

That

is,

the court excluded evidence

regarding a line-up identiﬁcation because that evidence was a product 0f unlawful police

conduct.

Leonard does not support the proposition advanced by Howard—that

14

all

evidence

must be suppressed

against a defendant, even if not the product 0f unlawful police conduct,

ofﬁcers learn the defendant’s

Nor, though
identiﬁcation,

name

as a result of police illegality.

Howard gave no

would

there be

indication

any basis

below

to suppress

that

he was attempting t0 suppress such an

an in-court identiﬁcation of Howard by

Trooper Green. Trooper Green saw Howard and spoke t0 him immediately
the vehicle.

it

(T12, p.13,

L.12 — p.14, L.16; EX.1, 00:54 — 01:25.)

was Trooper Green’s use of handcuffs

that

Howard could

authority

initial

makes

it

initially

that

On

appeal,

was unlawful. (Respondent’s

be detained as part 0f the trafﬁc

clear that a passenger cannot

after

Trooper Green employed handcuffs well

Howard’s much

Howard

later provision

after

Howard

Howard

exited

argues that

p.10 (conceding

brief,

stop, but arguing that “Idaho

be seized and placed in handcuffs beyond that

detention for ofﬁcer safety purposes or t0 control the scene unless the risk

Green’s ability t0 identify

if

is

substantial”).)

he observed and spoke to Howard. Thus, Trooper

as the passenger in the vehicle has nothing t0

of his name.

(TL, p. 13, Ls. 12-24; EX.

1,

11:45

do with

— 11:49

(Howard’s self—identiﬁcation).)
Further, even if the state did

somehow need

to rely

0n Howard’s provision of his name,

and not just on Trooper Green’s in—court identiﬁcation 0f Howard as the passenger, Howard has
not

shown

that

even that statement was the product 0f police

illegality.

He

apparently does not

dispute that he could be detained as part of the stop, and focuses instead 0n the fact that he

handcuffed.

Howard makes n0

attempt t0 argue, below 0r 0n appeal, that the fact that he was

handcuffed, as opposed to detained without being handcuffed, led to his self—identiﬁcation.

United States

V.

Thomas, 434

was

F.

App’x 725, 729 (10th

Cir.

E

2011) (unpublished) (Where

defendant argued that he was unlawfully detained because he was handcuffed, holding that there

was no

factual

nexus between the alleged

illegality
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and the discovery of the evidence because the

defendant

made n0

attempt t0 argue

that,

absent the handcufﬁng, as opposed t0 the detention, the

evidence would not have been recovered).4

Howard

his

And,

in fact,

name, the ofﬁcers had already seen marijuana

independent probable cause to detain and arrest Howard.

When

510-11, 5 P.3d 488, 490-91 (Ct. App. 2000).

was lawﬁllly

the time Trooper

in plain

m

View

Green asked

in the vehicle

and had

State V. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508,

Trooper Green asked Howard’s name, he

detained.

Even assuming, arguendo,
marijuana in plain View, the

0f that

by

that

Howard was unlawfully

district court erred

detained before ofﬁcers observed

by suppressing evidence

that

was not

the product

illegality.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Howard’s motion

to suppress

DATED this

lst

Court to reverse the

district court’s

order granting

and remand for ﬁthher proceedings.

day 0f April, 2020.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

4

The state recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and does not cite
them as authority for a particular decision in this case. Rather, the state merely references them as
historical examples of how a learned court has analyzed the question at issue. Compare Staff of
Idaho Real Estate

Comm’n

V.

Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting Bourgeois V.

Mugphy, 119 Idaho 61 1, 617 (1991)) (“When this Court had cause t0 consider unpublished
opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his petition, we
found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as ‘quite appropriat[e].’ Likewise, we ﬁnd the
hearing ofﬁcer’s consideration 0f the unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an

example, was appropriate”).
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